Conflict of Unmentioned Name: Lessons for the military from Afghanistan

Conflict of Unmentioned Name: Lessons for the military from Afghanistan

In a recent episode of the Social Science of War podcast, hosted by the Department of Social Sciences at West Point, three guests with extensive experience in Afghanistan shared their insights on the lessons the U.S. military and government should learn from the 20-year conflict.

The guests included Major Sam Wilkins, an active duty US Army Special Forces officer who has published multiple articles on Afghanistan and irregular warfare, and has deployed to the country during the surge. Major Wilkins' most recent article examines the rise and fall of Village Stability Operations.

Another guest was Dr. Jason Lyall, an associate professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, who has conducted fieldwork in Afghanistan, published extensively on counterinsurgency and conflict in fragile states, and is currently writing a book on lessons learned from the American war in Afghanistan.

Retired Lieutenant General Doug Lute, who has served as the assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, was also a guest on the podcast.

The conversation addressed key areas of U.S. performance in Afghanistan, including strategic design, security force assistance, building effective partner forces, encouraging tactical-level units to focus on partner forces, and overmilitarization of efforts.

Scholars have found weak evidence that counterinsurgency, as implemented in Afghanistan, works, as captured in Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. The podcast highlighted that conventional armies like the U.S. military were ill-equipped to fight asymmetrical warfare against insurgents employing guerrilla tactics, necessitating intelligence-led, coalition, and local partnerships early on.

The U.S. focus shifting to Iraq in 2003, treating Afghanistan as a “forgotten war," allowed the Taliban to regroup and regain strength, diminishing the effectiveness of U.S. efforts and prolonging the conflict. The podcast also discussed the importance of aligning military strategies with realistic political objectives, adequately resourcing reconstruction with transparency, and understanding the complex socio-political fabric in conflict zones to avoid repeating costly mistakes.

The episode also addressed the theoretical assumptions underpinning U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine as implemented in Afghanistan. The role of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) was highlighted as crucial in identifying massive waste and corruption that undermined the mission, with political leaders often ignoring such insights, leading to repeated strategic failures.

The article was published through the Irregular Warfare Initiative, and the Social Science of War podcast is produced by the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. The podcast serves as an important platform for experts to share their insights on the complexities of modern warfare and the lessons learned from the U.S.'s 20-year involvement in Afghanistan.

As the focus shifts to strategic competition, there may be resistance from the military and broader U.S. government in learning and accepting these lessons. However, the collective insights underline the importance of understanding the complex socio-political fabric in conflict zones, aligning military strategies with realistic political objectives, and adequately resourcing reconstruction with transparency to avoid repeating costly mistakes in future interventions.

1. The U.S. military and government must learn from the 20-year conflict in Afghanistan, as discussed in a recent episode of the Social Science of War podcast, produced by the Department of Social Sciences at West Point.
2. Major Sam Wilkins, an active duty US Army Special Forces officer, emphasized the need to understand the complex socio-political fabric in conflict zones to avoid repeat mistakes in future interventions.
3. Dr. Jason Lyall, an associate professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, noted that conventional armies like the U.S. military were ill-equipped to fight asymmetrical warfare against insurgents.
4. The conversation highlighted the importance of aligning military strategies with realistic political objectives, adequately resourcing reconstruction with transparency, and learning from past mistakes in the context of national security, politics, warfare, and education-and-self-development.

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