The Conundrum of Identity: How Disentangling Cases Paves Way for a Flawed Counterterrorism Tactic
In the turbulent landscape of northeastern Nigeria, the evolving dynamics between Boko Haram and its splinter group, Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), have become a topic of significant interest. Recent rumors suggest that these two groups may be merging once again, underscoring the importance of paying acute attention to ground-level affinities.
The story of Boko Haram and ISWAP is a complex one, dating back to March 2015 when Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, becoming the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP). However, after a split in 2016, the designation 'Boko Haram' is still frequently used to refer to various iterations and branches of the groups, past and present.
This disaggregation problem, as discussed in a piece by Jason Warner, an assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, and Stephanie Lizzo, a master's student at Sciences Po, arises due to factors such as internal leadership struggles, ideological differences within the group, external military pressure, and competition among various factions for control and resources.
The incomplete understanding of these violent extremist organizations' (VEOs) disparate motivations and methods can engender suboptimal kinetic and nonkinetic policies to address them. For instance, the Nigerian military's 'super camp strategy' adopted in 2019, which consolidated soldiers into a few, heavily fortified bases, intended to counter ISWAP. However, it focused too narrowly on the faction's armed capabilities, allowing ISWAP to capitalize on the opportunity to expand its areas of operations and deepen its ties with communities.
Meanwhile, the failure to give nuanced attention to factions of VEOs can also lead to suboptimal policies. The super camp strategy, for example, allowed Boko Haram under the late Abubakar Shekau to thrive, as militants could murder civilians and raze villages without much opposition.
Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, is reported to have killed himself via a suicide bomb in June. His death may strengthen the position of ISWAP, considered the more dangerous jihadist group in northeastern Nigeria. ISWAP seeks to win hearts and minds of civilians in its areas of operation, providing education, health services, and financial assistance, and is attempting to create four caliphates.
The piece by Warner and Lizzo refers to the problems in the availability of current data to disaggregate the violence of these groups. Effective efforts to counter VEOs depend on crafting carefully tailored approaches unique to each VEO, understanding not only their kinetic capabilities but their interactions with the publics they operate in.
It's crucial to note that the views expressed in the piece are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Boko Haram terrorized the civilian population of northeastern Nigeria and kidnapped hundreds of schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014. As the situation continues to evolve, it's essential to maintain a clear and informed understanding of the various factions and their strategies to ensure effective counter-terrorism efforts.
